Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) - Securities and Commercial Fraud as Racketeering Crime after Sedima: What Is a Pattern of Racketeering Activity? by Black, Barbara
Pace Law Review
Volume 6
Issue 3 Spring 1986 Article 2
April 1986
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) - Securities and Commercial Fraud as
Racketeering Crime after Sedima: What Is a Pattern
of Racketeering Activity?
Barbara Black
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barbara Black, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) - Securities and Commercial
Fraud as Racketeering Crime after Sedima: What Is a Pattern of Racketeering Activity?, 6 Pace L. Rev.
365 (1986)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/2
Articles
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) - Securities and
Commercial Fraud as Racketeering Crime
after Sedima: What is a "Pattern of
Racketeering Activity"?
Barbara Blackt
I. Background
A. The Statute
Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act 1 (RICO) in 1970 in order to stem the infiltration
and corruption of legitimate businesses by organized crime.2
During the 1970's, civil litigants virtually ignored the statute,'
but in the 1980's the utility of RICO's civil provisions has come
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1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
2. The statement of findings and purpose of the act recites that "[ilt is the purpose
of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States... by provid-
ing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §
1, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1073.
For a comprehensive discussion of the legislative history of RICO, see Blakey, The
RICO Civil Fraud Action In Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 237, 249-80 (1982); Milner, A Civil RICO Bibliography, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 409
(1985).
3. See Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1101 n.7 (1982); see also REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK
FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW 55 (1985).
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to be generally recognized.' Attorneys representing the victims
of securities and commercial fraud now routinely add a claim
alleging a RICO violation.5 It is the attractiveness of the rem-
edy - the successful plaintiff's recovery of treble damages and
attorney's fees - that has led to this ever increasing use of
RICO.6
To establish a claim, a plaintiff must show that the defend-
ant violated section 1962 of the statute and injured the plaintiff
in his business or property by reason of such activity. Section
1962 makes it unlawful to invest in an enterprise income derived
from a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection
of an unlawful debt;7 to acquire or maintain an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an
unlawful debt;8 and to conduct the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an
4. Some attribute the sudden increase in civil RICO litigation to an article co-au-
thored by the Chief Counsel to the Senate Subcommittee which proposed RICO, Blakey
& Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Con-
cepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980). Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 486-87 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
5. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub
nom., Moss v. Newman, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984) (plaintiffs, shareholders who sold stock on
the open market prior to announcement of a tender offer, charged that traders who pur-
chased on the basis of nonpublic information had a duty to disclose); Bankers Trust Co.
v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984) (plaintiff was the target of a bankruptcy fraud).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) states: "Any person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter . . . shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee."
In addition, bringing a RICO claim affords plaintiffs other advantages. A RICO
count assures the plaintiff of a federal forum, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d
482, 492, 503 (2d Cir. 1984) (disallowing this result because of the "clanging silence of
the legislative history"), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985); it creates a private cause of action
for many federal crimes where none previously existed, Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman,
566 F. Supp. 1235, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (refusing to allow this "revolutionary conse-
quence" without a single mention in the legislative history) (quoting Moss v. Morgan
Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied sub nom., Moss v. Newman, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984)); it creates alternative remedies
for federal crimes which explicitly provide for private causes of action, Feldesman, 566
F. Supp. at 1241 (refusing to make a "fundamental change in the nature of private dam-
age remedies" without clear congressional intent); and it may broaden the scope of dis-
covery since, under the definition of "pattern of racketeering activity," see infra note 13,
ten years may elapse between the predicate acts.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982).
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/2
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unlawful debt.9 In addition, it is illegal to conspire to do any of
the above.'0 Section 1961 provides definitions for the Act's oper-
ative terms, including "racketeering activity,"'" "enterprise,'
' 2
"pattern of racketeering activity,' 3 and "unlawful debt.' 4 Sec-
tion 1963 provides criminal penalties for violations of section
1962.' 5 Finally, section 1964 provides civil remedies, including a
private cause of action for any person "injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962. ' ' "s
A key element in proving a RICO violation is the "pattern
of racketeering activity." A "pattern of racketeering activity" re-
quires the commission of at least two acts of racketeering activ-
ity (commonly referred to as predicate offenses) within a ten-
year period.' 7 "Racketeering activity" is defined in terms of a
number of state and federal offenses.' 8 Plaintiffs in securities
and commercial fraud cases typically rely on three of the enu-
merated predicate offenses: any offense involving fraud in the
sale of securities punishable under any law of the United
States;' 9 any act indictable under the federal mail fraud stat-
ute;20 and any act indictable under the federal wire fraud
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. III 1985) defines "racketeering activity" in terms of a
number of state and federal offenses, including "(B) any act which is indictable under
any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: . . . section 1341 (relating
to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud) . . . [or] (D) any offense involving
• . . fraud in the sale of securities ......
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982) states: "'enterprise' includes any individual, partner-
ship, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity."
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) states: "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of
this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of
imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1982).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (Supp. III 1985).
16. See supra note 6.
17. See supra note 13.
18. See supra note 11.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (Supp. III 1985). See supra note 11.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (Supp. III 1985). This section refers to 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
3
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statute.2'
Establishing the predicate offenses, however, is not in itself
sufficient to establish a RICO violation. The illegal conduct must
have been committed for one of the illegal purposes specified in
section 1962.22 Plaintiffs in securities and commercial fraud
cases commonly use section 1962(c).23 Interpreting the various
elements of the statute, and their relationship to each other, has
caused considerable judicial confusion. In addition, the courts
have engaged in continuing attempts to limit the scope of the
private RICO claim.
B. Early History of Private Litigation
Many district courts used a number of different theories in
order to restrict the application of civil RICO. Initially, the most
popular rationale for dismissing a plaintiff's RICO claim was
that the defendant must have some nexus with organized
crime.24 As alternative or additional approaches, many courts
reasoned that Congress could not have intended to federalize all
business fraud cases 25 or to supplant the fraud provisions in
See supra note 11.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (Supp. III 1985). This section refers to 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
See supra note 11.
22. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 9. Under § 1962(c), a corporate entity may not simultaneously be
the "enterprise" and the "person" who conducts the affairs of the enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity. Bennett v. United States Trust Co. of N.Y., 770 F.2d
308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 800 (1986). The Seventh Circuit has held
that under § 1962(a), the liable person may be a corporation using the proceeds of a
"pattern of racketeering activity" in its operations. Masi v. Ford City Bank & Trust Co.,
779 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1985). This holding, which is questionable, may cause plaintiffs to
attempt to recast § 1962(c) claims into § 1962(a) claims.
24. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260
(E.D. La. 1981) (legislative history reveals a clearly expressed legislative intent that
RICO should only apply to organized crime); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F.
Supp. 736, 746-48 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (legislative history shows that the Act's application is
limited to entities involved with organized crime or activites within the penumbra of that
phrase); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Act is "aimed at a
society of criminals who seek to operate outside of the [law]").
25. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 719
F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom, Moss v. Newman, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984);
Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La.
1981).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/2
1986] RICO
other federal statutes;"6 and that the judiciary must impose lim-
its on private RICO claims because there is no "prosecutorial
discretion" to weed out marginal cases.17 Courts also tried to
curb the application of civil RICO by asserting that the injury
complained of must result from "enterprise" involvement in
racketeering activity, rather than from the racketeering activity
itself,28 or that the plaintiff must suffer a "competitive"2 9 or
"racketeering" 30 injury. Most of these analyses did not survive
scrutiny at the circuit court level until the Second Circuit's deci-
sion in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 31
In Sedima, the Second Circuit imposed two restrictions on
private RICO actions. First, the defendant must have been con-
victed of either the RICO offense or the underlying predicate
offenses. 2 Second, the plaintiff must suffer a special RICO
26. Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 591 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1984); Harper v. New
Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-08 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
27. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482, 497 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd,
105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985) (citing to UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' STAFF MANUAL, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, RICO GUIDELINES (Jan. 30, 1981)).
28. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
3275 (1985); Landmark Say. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (E.D. Mich.
1981).
29. Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (it is
appropriate to limit the extraordinary private remedy of § 1964 to persons who have
suffered a competitive injury by reason of racketeering activity); North Barrington Dev.
Corp. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (plaintiff must allege how he was
injured competitively by the RICO violation in order to state a cause of action).
30. Willamette Say. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1428-29
(D. Or. 1984) (a racketeering enterprise injury would occur if the defendant's ability to
harm the plaintiff is enhanced by the infusion of money from a pattern of racketeering
activity); In re Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 851-52 (E.D. Va. 1983)
(Section 1964(c) compensates plaintiffs who suffer racketeering injuries, not injuries re-
sulting solely from predicate acts); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp.
1002, 1007-08 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (because Congress could not have intended to grant treble
damages to those persons injured directly from the predicate acts, a racketeering injury
requirement is entirely consistent with the legislative history of the statute).
31. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275
(1985). Sedima, the plaintiff, was a Belgian supplier of aerospace and defense equipment,
and the defendant, Imrex, was a New York based exporter of aviation parts. The two
companies entered a joint venture for the purpose of supplying parts to a European cus-
tomer. Sedima charged that Imrex submitted fraudulently inflated bills, thereby receiv-
ing disbursements in excess of what was actually due. Id. at 484-85. The complaint con-
tained counts in unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of a constructive trust as well as RICO violations.
32. Id. at 496-504.
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injury.33
There was no justification for the prior conviction require-
ment in either the statute or its legislative history. Other courts
had considered and rejected the requirement of a conviction as a
prerequisite to a private RICO suit.3 4 To justify this require-
ment, the Sedima court set forth a tortured construction of the
statute.35 The Sedima court's central concern, however, was the
difficulty in determining criminal conduct in a civil trial 6 be-
cause of what it viewed as due process requirements.37
33. Id. at 494-96.
34. USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982)
(holding that a private civil suit under § 1964(c) exists without a prior conviction under
§ 1963); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
925 (1975) (holding that a civil proceeding under § 1964 by the federal government is an
allowable alternative to a criminal proceeding under § 1963). Contra Rush v. Oppen-
heimer & Co., 592 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that a prior criminal convic-
tion is required); Bennett v. E.F. Hutton.& Co., 597 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Ohio 1984)
(holding that plaintiff must establish that there is probable cause to believe that the
predicate acts were committed); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D.
Ga. 1983) (holding that plaintiff must establish that there is probable cause to believe
that the predicate acts were committed).
35. The Second Circuit relied on what it deemed a "plausible" definition of the
words "indictable" and "chargeable" in § 1961(a): "[T]hat Congress did not intend to
give civil courts power to determine whether an act is 'indictable' in the absence of a
properly returned indictment or 'chargeable' absent an information," Sedima, 741 F.2d
at 499-500.
The court also compared the RICO remedy to the antitrust remedy. It noted that
§ 4 of the Clayton Act allowed recovery for anybody "injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws," Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. 15(a)
(1983), while § 1964(c) allows recovery if the injury was "by reason of a violation of
section 1962." The court reasoned that use of the word "violation," rather than the
phrase "anything forbidden," indicated a legislative intent to require a criminal convic-
tion for the predicate acts. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498-99.
36. This argument was based primarily on the burden of proof. It was noted that no
court had ever required that the predicate acts be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in a
private RICO action. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 501 n.53. Nevertheless, since RICO only pun-
ishes criminal conduct, the court concluded that when there is no previous conviction for
the predicate acts, the plaintiff must meet the burden of proof required in a criminal
proceeding. The court believed that requiring the jury to apply the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard to the predicate acts and a preponderance standard to all other elements
would impose too great a burden on the jury. A previous conviction requirement would
eliminate this difficulty. Id. at 501-02.
37. This rationale presumed that RICO was a criminal statute and as a result must
be strictly construed. In light of this conclusion, the court felt that the liberal construc-
tion provision, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 922, 947 (1970), would be unconstitutional, and would therefore be useless unless a
criminal conviction was required. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 502-03.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/2
The requirement of a special RICO injury was derived from
the fact that Congress had looked to the private antitrust rem-
edy38 as a model for section 1964(c), i.e., "any person injured...
by reason of a violation of section 1962" may recover treble
damages. Because this language in the antitrust law created the
requirement of a "competitive injury, '39 the court concluded
that the RICO statute required an analogous "racketeering in-
jury."' 0 The Second Circuit, however, developed this require-
ment to revive the previously discredited 41 "mafia defendant"
argument. This is evident in the court's statement that:
RICO was not enacted merely because criminals break laws,
but because mobsters either through the infiltration of legit-
imate enterprises or through the activities of illegitimate en-
terprises, cause systematic harm to competition and the
market, and thereby injure investors and competitors .... It
is only when injury caused by this kind of harm can be
shown, therefore, that we believe that Congress intended
that standing to sue civilly should be granted.42
Sedima provides no specific examples of this "special injury."
It is interesting to note that the Second Circuit revived this
"mafia defendant" requirement after explicitly rejecting it in
Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc.43 The fact that the Moss decision
was explicitly mentioned by the Sedima court"" as eliminating a
requirement of a connection with organized crime4 5 lends
credence to the idea that the Second Circuit was striving to find
a way to dismiss this case and thereby limit the use of civil
RICO.
Additionally, the court was reluctant to brand a defendant a "racketeer" without
first convicting him of a crime. Id. at 487-88.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982), which states in part that "any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor .... " (emphasis added).
39. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
40. Sedirna, 741 F.2d at 495.
41. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub
nom., Moss v. Newman, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
42. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 495-96.
43. 719 F.2d 5, 21-23 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom., Moss v. Newman, 465
U.S. 1025 (1984).
44. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 492 n.31.
45. See supra note 41.
1986] RICO
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Sedima was the first of three RICO cases decided by the
Second Circuit in a three-day period.46 The second, Bankers
Trust Co. v. Rhoades,4 7 agreed with Sedima's reasoning48 and
attempted to clarify it by defining a racketeering injury by ex-
ample. The Rhoades court concluded that a RICO plaintiff can
only recover if he is damaged by the pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity itself, and not merely by the predicate acts.4 9 The court
gave as an example a plaintiff who is victimized by multiple acts
of arson committed by a defendant and is subsequently denied
fire insurance based on this history. If he should later suffer fire
damage not caused by defendants, he has incurred a racketeer-
ing injury to the extent of the uninsured fire 1os8.60 Under this
definition, then, plaintiff can only recover for his indirect
injuries 5 1
The division within the judiciary with respect to the scope
of the private RICO claim was exemplified by the third decision
of the Second Circuit's trilogy, Furman v. Cirrito.51 The panel
deciding this case was compelled to follow Sedima and Rhoades
as binding precedent, but dissented from the reasoning of these
cases.5 ' Clearly, the matter was ripe for Supreme Court review.
C. The Supreme Court's Decision in Sedima
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in a five-
to-four decision. The Court first addressed the prior conviction
requirement. The Court found nothing in the statutory language
to support a prior conviction requirement,5 nor did it find sup-
46. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275
(1985); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984); Furman v. Cirrito,
741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984).
47. 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984).
48. Id. at 516-17.
49. Id. at 516-18.
50. Id. at 517.
51. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 396-97 (7th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985), (criticizing this example as compensating only indi-
rect injuries).
52. 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984).
53. Id. at 525.
54. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985). Chief Justice Burger, Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens
and O'Connor in the majority; Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Powell
dissenting.
55. Id. at 3281-84. The Court was unimpressed with the Second Circuit's argument
[Vol. 6:365
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port for the Second Circuit's interpretation in the legislative his-
tory.56 In fact, the Court noted that "[t]he only specific reference
in the legislative history to prior convictions ... [was] an objec-
tion that the treble damages provision is too broad precisely be-
cause 'there need not be a conviction under any of these laws for
it to be racketeering.'-57
After rejecting the Second Circuit's due process related ar-
guments, the Court stated:
In sum, we can find no support in the statute's history, its
language, or considerations of policy for a requirement that
a private treble damages action under § 1964(c) can proceed
only against a defendant who has already been criminally
convicted. To the contrary, every indication is that no such
requirement exists.
58
There was no dissent on this point.59
The Court next addressed the requirement of a "racketeer-
ing injury." The Court first noted that it was unclear whether
the Second Circuit intended the "special injury" requirement as
a standing requirement or as a limitation on damages. What the
Second Circuit intended, however, was irrelevant to a majority
of the justices." In rejecting this requirement, the Court relied
on the unambiguous language of the statute and on the Congres-
sional mandate that it was to be "'liberally construed to effectu-
ate its remedial purposes.' "61 The Court made it clear that a
violation of section 1964(c) is established by showing: "(1) con-
that the use of the word "violation" in § 1964(c) mandated a criminal conviction. The
Court refused to look past the ordinary meaning of the word, i.e., "[it refers only to a
failure to adhere to legal requirements." Id. at 3281. Additionally, the Court noted that
the Act's definition of "racketeering activity" refers to acts for which a defendant could
be convicted, not for which he has been convicted, i.e., the Court did not agree that the
words "indictable" and "chargeable" required that an indictment or information be in
force. Id. at 3281; see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
56. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3281.
57. Id. at 3282 (quoting 116 CONG. REc. 35, 342 (1970) (emphasis added by the
Court)).
58. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3284.
59. Id. at 3288-91 (Powell, J., dissenting); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct.
3292 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting to both the Sedima and Haroco decisions by sepa-
rate opinion).
60. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. 3284-87.
61. Id. at 3286, (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
§ 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970)). See also supra note 37.
19861 RICO
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duct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeer-
ing activity. . . . In addition, the plaintiff only has standing if,
and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in
his business or property by the conduct constituting the viola-
tion. '6 2 Imposing any additional requirements would emasculate
the civil provision and as a result, the remedial purpose of the
Act. 3 In closing, the majority noted that the Act was not being
used as originally intended by Congress; it was unwilling, how-
ever, to create a judicial amendment to a legislative act. 4
D. The Importance of Sedima
Sedima was the Supreme Court's first examination of civil
RICO; the two previous RICO cases decided by the Court in-
volved criminal proceedings. 5 Thus, the Court's decision was
important as the first indicator of the Court's views on civil
RICO. In addition, since the Second Circuit in Sedima practi-
cally eliminated the private remedy, the Court's decision deter-
mined the fate of the private remedy at the judicial level. While
the Court had adopted a broad view of RICO in the previous
criminal cases, many expected that the Court would not accept
the federalization of commercial fraud and would, therefore, re-
strictively interpret private RICO claims. Contrary to the Sec-
ond Circuit, the Sedima Court made it clear that civil RICO is
indeed a federal business fraud statute.6 The Court cited figures
from the Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the
ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law stating
that only nine percent of private suits involve allegations of
criminal activity of a type generally associated with organized
crime, forty percent involve securities fraud, and thirty-seven
62. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285.
63. Id. at 3286.
64. Id. at 3287. The dissents of Justice Powell, Id. at 3288, and Justice Marshall, Id.
at 3292, agreed that the majority decision permitted the use of civil RICO in situations
never intended by Congress. They took the view that the legislative history showed an
intent to limit the Act to those engaged in organized crime and that the racketeering
injury requirement was necessary to achieve this goal. Additionally, the dissenting Jus-
tices were unwilling to permit the drastic legal results which would stem from the major-
ity's holding. See supra note 6.
65. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576 (1981).
66. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
[Vol. 6:365
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percent common law fraud in a commercial or business setting.67
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, while doubting the wisdom of
the policy, made it clear that policy was a Congressional deci-
sion. Congress had expressly provided a private remedy with tre-
mendous breadth. The fact that private RICO was evolving into
something quite different from the original conception of its en-
actors was, therefore, not grounds for judicial activism."
Thus, the Court in Sedima placed responsibility for amend-
ing the RICO statute on Congress. Nevertheless, the Court did
not close the door on all judicial attempts to limit private
RICO's scope. The Court extended an invitation to the lower
courts to develop a meaningful concept of a "pattern of racke-
teering activity." 9 The Court emphasized that the definition of
"pattern of racketeering activity" requires "at least two acts of
racketeering activity ... not that it means two such acts....
[W]hile two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient. '7 0
The Court noted that "in common parlance, two of anything do
not generally form a 'pattern.' "71 It found support in the legisla-
tive history for "the view that two isolated acts of racketeering
activity do not constitute a pattern. '7 2
As the Senate Report explained: "The target of [RICO] is
thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate bus-
iness normally requires more than one 'racketeering activity'
and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this
factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to
produce a pattern." S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 158 (1969) (em-
phasis added). Similarly, the sponsor of the Senate bill, after
quoting this portion of the Report, pointed out to his col-
leagues that "[tihe term 'pattern' itself requires the showing
of a relationship.... So, therefore, proof of two acts of rack-
eteering activity, without more, does not establish a pattern.
." 116 Cong. Rec. 18940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClel-
lan). See also id., at 35193 (statement of Rep. Poff) (RICO
"not aimed at the isolated offender"); House Hearings, at
67. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287 n.16 (citing REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK
FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINEss LAW 55-56 (1985)).
68. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 3285 n.14 (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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665.7'
It also referred to the definition of "pattern" in another section
of the bill: "'criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces
criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results,
participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise
are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not iso-
lated events.' ,74
II. "Pattern of Racketeering Activity" After Sedima
Since Sedima, the courts have been struggling to determine
what is necessary to have "more than two isolated acts." The
focus has been on two concepts, relationship and continuity.75
These elements can be exemplified by contrasting two signifi-
cant post-Sedima cases.
In R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt,7 plaintiff sued two de-
fendants who allegedly attempted to defraud him by twice mail-
ing him false invoices. Judge Wisdom, speaking for the Fifth
Circuit, found a "pattern" here because these acts were related
and were not two isolated events." Judge Wisdom observed that
this case "stretches the statutory language to its limit,"7 8 yet he
declined the Supreme Court's invitation to develop yet another
approach to restrict RICO.
In contrast, in Northern Bank/O'Hare v. Inryco, Inc.,79 a
bank charged a contractor with participation in a kickback
scheme. Plaintiff alleged as the requisite predicate offenses the
mailing of a subcontract and the mailing of a kickback check.
The district court found no "pattern" here, because a pattern
connotes a multiplicity of events.80 "Surely the continuity inher-
ent in the term presumes repeated criminal activity, not merely
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1970)).
75. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
76. 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985).
77. Id. at 1355.
78. Id. at 1357. But see Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, 785 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1986), where a different panel expressed no opinion
as to whether Sedima required a narrower interpretation of pattern and made no refer-
ence to Hyatt.
79. 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
80. Id. at 829-30.
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repeated acts to carry out the same criminal activity. It places a
real strain on the language to speak of a single fraudulent effort,
implemented by several fraudulent acts, as a 'pattern of racke-
teering activity.' ',81 A subsequent district court opinion noted
that Inryco involved merely two "ministerial acts performed in
the execution of a single fraudulent transaction. 8 2 Under In-
ryco, two allegations of mail fraud do not constitute a pattern. 3
In dictum, moreover, the court stated that even if plaintiff
amended his complaint to allege that three additional kickback
payments involved use of the mails, there still would not be a
pattern because there is still but one fraudulent scheme. Unless
plaintiff can show similar racketeering acts occurring in different
criminal episodes, there is no continuity.8 4
In the RICO securities and commercial fraud cases, there is
typically a fraudulent scheme effected through multiple mail-
ings, so that at least one, and often all, of the predicate offenses
is a mail (or wire) fraud violation.' Establishing a relationship
between the predicate acts is not a problem. Indeed, the prob-
lem the Inryco court had with these cases is that the acts are too
related. While each mailing in furtherance of the fraud may
technically be a separate violation of the mail fraud statute, In-
ryco is saying that plaintiffs complaint alleges one discrete
fraud which cannot be subdivided into two parts for purposes of
establishing a RICO claim.86 Plaintiff's claim may fail, then, for
failure to establish the requisite continuity. To illustrate, assume
that plaintiff sues his partner in a joint venture, alleging that
defendant had, on one occasion, defrauded him by sending him
a telegram of a false invoice and also, on the same day, mailing
an identical copy. After Sedima, most courts, with the possible
exception of the Fifth Circuit, would almost certainly not find a
pattern here, because there is no continuity. This is in contrast
to the pre-Sedima case law, where most courts found a pattern
81. Id. at 831 (emphasis in original).
82. Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222, 225 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
83. Inryco, 615 F. Supp. at 833.
84. Id. at 831-32 (quoting United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57-58 (D. Conn.
1975)).
85. See, e.g., supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
86. Inryco, 615 F. Supp. at 831-34.
1986] RICO
13
PACE LAW REVIEW
automatically upon the finding of two predicate acts. 7
On the other hand, assume that plaintiff alleges that his
partner defrauded him over a period of time by mailing him a
series of false invoices. By increasing the number of predicate
acts, by varying the contents of each communication in order to
make each appear more "separate," and by extending them over
a period of time in order to make the fraud appear more contin-
uous, the argument that this is only one indivisible fraud is
weakened. Is this enough to find a pattern, or must plaintiff
show something more?
To date, only one circuit court opinion has required some-
thing more to satisfy the element of continuity. In Superior Oil
Co. v. Fulmer,8 the Eighth Circuit held that plaintiff failed to
prove that the conversion of liquid petroleum gas by a former
employee and his associates was anything more than one iso-
lated fraudulent scheme. Continuity was not established by
proving that defendants' actions comprised "one continuing
scheme."' 9 There must be proof that defendants had previously
engaged in these activities, or that they were engaged in other
criminal activities elsewhere, or, perhaps, that they threatened
similar future frauds.90 In contrast, in another Eighth Circuit
opinion, Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Industries,91 an ac-
counting firm charged a scheme of mail and wire fraud designed
by its corporate client in order to obtain a favorable audit for
one year. The original complaint alleged at least twenty-six acts
of mail fraud and four acts of wire fraud. The Eighth Circuit
held that this constituted a pattern: "The number and nature of
acts, together with allegations demonstrating their similar pur-
poses, results, participants, victims, and methods of commission,
bespeak a sufficient 'continuity plus relationship' to satisfy the
Supreme Court's concerns . . . that RICO not be extended to
87. There were a few exceptions to the pre-Sedima trend. Exeter Towers Assoc. v.
Bowditch, 604 F. Supp. 1547 (D. Mass. 1985); Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie,
537 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Pa. 1981). Both opinions emphasized the congressional purpose of
fighting organized crime.
88. 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
89. Id. at 257.
90. Id.
91. 770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom., Kahn v. Alexander Grant &
Co., 106 S. Ct. 799 (1986).
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reach sporadic activity. '92
The Seventh Circuit upheld a RICO claim brought by state
taxing authorities against a retailer that mailed nine fraudulent
state sales tax returns over a nine-month period in Illinois De-
partment of Revenue v. Phillips.93 Although decided within two
months after Sedima, the opinion contains no discussion of
"pattern." Subsequent district court opinions in the Seventh
Circuit have reasoned that there was a pattern in Phillips be-
cause each mailing was a separate offense causing a separate in-
jury. In this way the district courts have attempted to distin-
guish Phillips9 from Inryco, 5 where the predicate acts were
multiple mailings in a single fraudulent scheme.90 This at-
tempted distinction ignores the fact that under the mail and
wire fraud statutes each communication is technically a separate
offense. The difference here is one of degree, not of kind. Never-
theless, the courts are right that there is a difference: the retailer
in Phillips might well be prosecuted for filing one fraudulent
sales tax return, but the contractor in Inryco would never be
prosecuted under the mail fraud statute for mailing one
subcontract.
Finally, among the circuits, in Bank of America National
Trust & Savings Association v. Touche Ross & Co., 97 the Elev-
enth Circuit held that the plaintiff banks had stated a RICO
cause of action against the accounting firm of a corporation to
which the plaintiffs lent money. Subsequently, the corporation
went into bankruptcy.98 A pattern was alleged where the banks
specified nine separate acts of wire and mail fraud, involving the
92. Id. at 718 n.1.
93. 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985).
94. Medical Emergency Serv. Assocs. v. Foulke, 633 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Ill. 1986);
Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. 111. 1985). These opinions were both written
by Judge Getzendanner.
95. On the other hand, some district courts in the Seventh Circuit are unable to
harmonize the Inryco and Phillips decisions. Shore v. Freitag Realty, Inc., No. 83-C-2582
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1986) (available July 22, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. of Ill. v. Levy, No. 83-C-3566 (N.D. Il. Nov. 7, 1985) (availa-
ble July 22, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). Some district court opinions in
the Seventh Circuit have rejected Inryco's requirement of different criminal espisodes.
Trak Microcomputer Corp. v. Wearne Bros., 628 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
96. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
97. 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986).
98. Id. at 971.
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same parties over a period of three years, for the purpose of in-
ducing the banks to extend credit to the bankrupt corporation.
The standard which has been applied in this Circuit is
whether each act constitutes "a separate violation of the
[state or federal] statute" governing the conduct in question
.... If distinct statutory violations are found, the predicate
acts will be considered to be distinct irrespective of the cir-
cumstances under which they arose. 99
There is, however, a substantial body of case law at the dis-
trict court level for the view that continuity does require some-
thing more. 100 The Inryco dictum of separate criminal episodes
is the most common judicial gloss to the definition of "pattern."
A pattern, in the view of one district court, "must include racke-
teering acts sufficiently unconnected in time or substance to
warrant consideration as separate criminal episodes." 10 1 The def-
inition of pattern, then, becomes paradoxical: the acts must be
"related," yet "unconnected." Under this interpretation, our hy-
pothetical RICO plaintiff would, for example, have to allege not
only that his partner defrauded him by mailing him false in-
voices, but also that he defrauded him by burning down partner-
ship property. Plaintiff must now also be concerned that a court
might find these separate criminal episodes unrelated. Other
ways to establish continuity through emphasis on different crim-
99. Id. (quoting United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1475 (11th Cir.
1985)).
100. Soper v. Simmons Int'l, Ltd., 632 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Dunham v.
Independence Bank of Chicago, 629 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Torwest DBC, Inc. v.
Dick, 628 F. Supp. 163 (D. Colo. 1986); Medallion TV Enters., Inc. v. SELECTV of Cal.,
Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1290 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Fleet Management Sys., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co., 627 F. Supp. 550 (C.D. Ill. 1986); Kredietbank v. Joyce Morris, Inc., No.
84-1903 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 1986) (available July 22, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file); Modern Settings, Inc. v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 629 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Medical Emergency Serv. Assocs. v. Foulke, 633 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Ill. 1986);
Fagenholz v. AMF, Inc., No. 85-C-3456 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1985) (available July 22, 1986,
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); International Television Prods., Ltd. v. Twentieth-
Century Fox Television Div., 622 F. Supp. 1532 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Professional Assets
Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, 616 F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Okla. 1985); Allington
v. Carpenter, 619 F. Supp. 474 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 615 F.
Supp. 836 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Rojas v. First Bank Nat'l Assoc., 613 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y.
1985). Cf. SJ Advanced Technology & Mfg. Corp. v. Junkunc, 627 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
101. Allington v. Carpenter, 619 F. Supp. 474, 478 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
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inal episodes would be to show that plaintiff and defendant had
been involved in other ventures where the defendant had com-
mitted similar fraud, or that defendant had committed similar
frauds on other firms.'02
To other district courts, continuity embodies a requirement
that the fraud be ongoing. 103 This interpretation is based on
Sedima's quotation from the Senate Report on "the threat of
continuing activity.' 0 4 In Rojas v. First Bank National Associa-
tion,105 plaintiff alleged that defendant bank fraudulently in-
duced him to execute a guaranty and a note to back up several
loans defendant made to a shipping corporation formed by
plaintiff and his associates, of which plaintiff was the presi-
dent.'0 6 The court, in awarding summary judgment for the de-
fendant, found that plaintiff introduced no evidence to support
a finding of fraud. 10 7 Furthermore, the court observed that even
if plaintiff had proven fraud, he could not demonstrate a pat-
tern, because all he alleged were two discrete transactions with
defendant.'0 8 Although the court did not elaborate, the court ap-
parently determined that because these transactions were con-
cluded, there was no threat of continuing activity.'09
On the other hand, other district court decisions have noted
the period of time over which the acts took place, reasoning that
continuity is established by showing that the predicate acts took
place over a continuous period of time."10 Unlike the suggestion
102. See, e.g., SJ Advanced Technology & Mfg. Corp. v. Junkunc, 627 F. Supp. 572
(N.D. 11. 1986); Kredietbank v. Joyce Morris, Inc., No. 84-1903 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 1986)
(available July 22, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Papagiannis v. Pontikis,
108 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. 11. 1985).
103. See, e.g., Rojas v. First Bank Nat'l. Assoc., 613 F. Supp. 968, 971 n.1. (E.D.N.Y.
1985).
104. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
105. 613 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
106. Id. at 969.
107. Id. at 971.
108. Id. at 971 n.1. See also Lipin Enters., Inc. v. Lee, 625 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (twelve transactions were not sufficient).
109. Rojas, 613 F. Supp. at 971.
110. Corcoran Partners, Ltd. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., No. 84-C-4506 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
18, 1985) (available Apr. 6, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Trak Microcom-
puter Corp. v. Wearne Bros., 628 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Ill. 1985). Compare Modern Set-
tings, Inc. v. Prudential Bache Sec. Inc., 629 F. Supp. 860, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("single
episode of fraud, [plaintiff alleged malicious liquidation of its accounts] decried by plain-
tiffs for its very hastiness," even though each of the multiple sales may have violated the
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in Rojas, however, these courts do not require that the fraud be
ongoing at the time the suit is brought.
Thus, the circuit court opinions and a sizable number of the
district court opinions decided to date"' evidence an emerging
consensus of what pattern requires, a middle position between
Judge Wisdom's dispensing with any requirement of con-
tinuity 1 2 and either Inryco's requirement of at least two sepa-
rate criminal episodes'13 or Rojas' suggested requirement of
ongoing activity.' The relevant factors are the number of pred-
icate offenses (the more the better), the separateness of each of-
fense (the more it looks like a separate crime or tort, the better)
and the duration (the longer, the better). Specific examples of
what constitutes a "pattern" include: plaintiff alleging that it
bought a division from defendant based on a balance sheet
which overstated assets and understated liabilities;"15 plaintiff
alleging churning, misrepresentations as to riskiness, profitabil-
ity, type of activity in account, and deceptions as to broker's
skills, over an eighteen-month period;" 6 and plaintiff alleging a
two-year practice of embezzling funds from a corporation." 7
securities laws).
111. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Pittsburgh v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co.,
629 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); LSC Assocs. v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 629 F.
Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Shore v. Freitag Realty, Inc., No. 83-C-2582 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10,
1986) (available July 22, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Lumpkin v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., No. 81-C-6674 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 1986) (available July 22, 1986, on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); United Fish Co. v. Barnes, 627 F. Supp. 732 (D. Me.
1986); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Corcoran Part-
ners, Ltd. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., No. 84-C-4506 (N.D. Il. Dec. 18, 1985) (available July
22, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222
(N.D. Ill. 1985); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. of Ill. v. Levy, No. 83-C-3566 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
7, 1985) (available July 22, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Trak Microcom-
puter Corp. v. Wearne Bros., 628 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Conan Properties, Inc.
v. Mattel, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
112. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
115. Corcoran Partners, Ltd. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., No. 84-C-4506 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
18, 1985) (available July 22, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
116. Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
117. Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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III. Conclusion
This "middle position""' 8 in the case law is the correct ap-
proach. The legislative history cited in Sedima evidences more
concern about a relationship between the predicate acts than
continuity. In particular, the definition of "pattern" from an-
other provision of the same bill, which is quoted in a footnote to
the opinion,"" is exclusively focused on the relatedness of the
acts. 1 0 Nevertheless, some of the quoted legislative history does
deal with the element of continuity.'21 Hence, Judge Wisdom's
elimination of a continuity requirement in R.A.G.S. Couture,
Inc. v. Hyatt122 goes too far. Moreover, there is something to be
said for Sedima's "common parlance" argument: two is usually
not a pattern. On the other hand, Inryco and Rojas may place
too much emphasis on continuity. To accept Inryco's holding
that two acts of mail fraud which are merely ministerial acts in
furtherance of one indivisible scheme are not a pattern is not
necessarily to accept the view that two criminal episodes are re-
quired for a finding of a pattern. Similarly, the Rojas view that
the fraud must be ongoing should not be extended into a re-
quirement that the wrongdoing continue until the date of the
suit. Rather, continuity is established by a showing that the acts
took place over some period of time.
This article, however, cannot conclude without at least rais-
ing the larger issue - whether RICO should be amended. Sev-
eral legislative proposals have been introduced in Congress. 123
While hearings were held in the Fall of 1985, none of the propos-
als has been reported out of committee to date.
House Bill H.R. 2517 proposes a number of changes in the
definitional and offense provisions, including a new definition of
"pattern.' ' 24 It specifies that the predicate acts must be "sepa-
118. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
120. Id.
121. See supra text accompanying note 73.
122. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
123. S. 1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced by Sen. Hatch on July 29,
1985); H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced by Rep. Boucher on July 10,
1985); H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced by Rep. Congers on May 15,
1985).
124. The proposal would also amend the statute to delete use of the term "racke-
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rate in time and place" and "interrelated by a common scheme,
plan or motive, and are not isolated events."' 125 In addition, all of
the predicate acts cannot be violations of the same statute, if
that statute is the mail or wire fraud statute.126
The other two proposals would amend only section 1964(c).
House Bill H.R. 2943 would permit private civil RICO suits only
against defendants that have been convicted of racketeering ac-
tivity or of a violation of section 1962.127 In addition, a civil
RICO action would have to be brought within one year after the
latest conviction. 128
Senate Bill S. 1521 would require plaintiff to establish a
"competitive, investment, or other business injury" in order to
recover treble damages. 29, In addition, only with respect to sec-
tior 1964(c) actions, one of the predicate offenses would have to
be an act other than mail or wire fraud or an offense involving
fraud in the sale of securities.1 30 Moreover, the court would have
teering," so § 1961(5) would become the definition for "pattern of criminal activity."
H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1985).
125. Each of the predicate offenses must also have occurred "not more than five
years before the indictment is found, or information is instituted, that names such acts
as predicate criminal activity." Id. The proposal does not specify the consequences if
there is no indictment or information.
H.R. 2517's definition of "pattern" is similar to a proposed definition of "pattern"
made by the ABA's Criminal Justice Section RICO Cases Committee: "two or more occa-
sions of conduct that constitute criminal activity, are related to the affairs of the enter-
prise, are not isolated, and are not so closely related to each other and connected in point
of time and place that they constitute a single event." A similar redefinition of "pattern"
is proposed by the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law: "requiring (i) that the underlying predicate offenses be con-
nected to each other by a common scheme and (ii) that the underlying predicate offenses
arise in two or more separate and distinct criminal episodes." REPORT OF THE AD Hoc
CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS
LAW 208 (1985).
126. H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Seas. § 1 (1985). This is also true if the statutory
provision relates to the transportation of stolen goods, securities, moneys, fraudulent
state tax stamps, or articles used in counterfeiting. As drafted, if the other requirements
were met, a pattern would be found if there was one violation of the mail fraud statute
and one violation of the wire fraud statute. Id.
127. H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
128. Id. A committee of the Bar Association of the City of New York has also rec-
ommended a prior conviction requirement, but would extend it only to private civil ac-
tions. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL LEGIS-
LATION, REFORM OF THE PRIVATE CIVIL ACTION PROVISION OF RICO 21-23 (1986).
129. S. 1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
130. Id.
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discretion to award costs, including attorney's fees, to the de-
fendant if it determined that the suit was frivolous and without
merit.131
House Bill H.R. 2517's redefinition of "pattern" might have
an adverse effect on the criminal RICO prosecutions. The De-
partment of Justice criticized House Bill H.R. 2517's redefinition
as excluding certain types of criminal activity from RICO's
scope. For example, "several individuals could simultaneously
perform racketeering acts in concert at separate locations and
not come under RICO as amended."'132 Moreover, while gener-
ally the Justice Department does not bring RICO actions for
schemes involving mail or wire fraud unless there are two sepa-
rate criminal episodes, there are situations where the Depart-
ment may feel it is appropriate to bring such an action, as where
large sums of money are involved or where there are multiple
victims. 133
House Bill H.R. 2943 and Senate Bill S. 1521, since they
amend only the private RICO action, would be preferable. Sen-
ate Bill S. 1521, however, by adding a special injury require-
ment, adds an additional complexity to an already complex stat-
ute, and thus is undesirable."3 ' House Bill H.R. 2943 is virtually
the equivalent of eliminating the private suit. It is preferable to
the other two proposals in that it deals specifically with the pri-
vate remedy, and its solution is a simple one.'35 Congressional
consideration of these proposals, then, should be directed at this
most basic question: should there be private RICO suits at all?
The private treble damages remedy was added to the bill
late in the legislative process and without extended discussion.
There is no doubt that private' RICO has gone far beyond what
Congress originally intended. It is, therefore, appropriate for
Congress to reevaluate the private remedy in light of the past
fifteen years' experience.
131. Id.
132. Testimony of John C. Keeney, deputy assistant attorney general, before the
House Judiciary Criminal Justice Subcommittee, 17 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1659
(Sept. 20, 1985).
133. Interview with Associate Deputy Attorney General Jay B. Stephens, 17 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1790 (Oct. 11, 1985).
134. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
19861 RICO
21
PACE LAW REVIEW
There are two arguments for retaining private RICO ac-
tions: "'36 the concept of the private attorney general and the de-
sirability of a federal commercial fraud statute.
The prior conviction requirement eliminates the use of the
private attorney general to supplement prosecutorial efforts. The
Department of Justice cannot prosecute all RICO violators.
Those violators that escape detection, that are weeded out dur-
ing the screening process or that simply are not prosecuted due
to lack of resources, would be immune from civil RICO liabil-
ity. 37 The RICO private remedy, however, has not developed as
a supplement to federal enforcement. The report cited by the
Supreme Court in Sedima states that only nine percent of the
private suits involve allegations of criminal activity of a type
generally associated with professional criminals. 3 8 Seventy-
seven percent of the suits involve allegations of securities and
commercial fraud. 39 Therefore, whether a prior conviction re-
quirement should be enacted turns on a congressional determi-
nation as to whether it is indeed appropriate to provide victims
of fraud with a federal forum and to permit them to recover
treble damages and attorney's fees.
Respectable arguments in support of a federal general fraud
statute can be made based upon deterrence and compensation.
There is a perception among some that there is a substantial
amount of ongoing fraud, " suggesting that common law fraud
actions provide inadequate deterrence. Since many frauds go un-
detected, a defrauder may feel attempting fraud is worth the
risk if the risk upon detection is merely payment of compensa-
136. This is apart from the limited purpose of compensating the victims of criminal
RICO fraud, which is maintained in the proposed amendment. The author is aware of no
treble damages suit brought by a victim of organized crime. As many have observed, it is
unlikely any of these victims would dare to sue.
137. In addition, the plea-bargaining process may be distorted because of a defend-
ant's desire to avoid conviction of a RICO offense or predicate act. Testimony of John C.
Keeney, deputy assistant attorney general, before the House Judiciary Criminal Justice
Subcommittee, reported in 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1659 (Sept. 20, 1985).
138. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. In this author's opinion, nine per-
cent is high.
139. Id.
140. "White collar fraud in America is a 'growth industry' netting $40 billion a year
. .Testimony of Philip A. Feigin, on behalf of the North American Securities Ad-
ministrators Association, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, reported in 17 FED.
SEC. & L. REP. (BNA) 1447 (Aug. 9, 1985).
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tory damages.
Furthermore, plaintiffs' difficulties in proving fraud and in
establishing damages, along with the delays and expenses of liti-
gation, make it unlikely, in the view of some, that they will be
fully compensated. Accordingly, allowing them to recover treble
damages and attorney's fees corrects the current deficiencies of
fraud victims' damage awards.
It is time for Congress to address these issues directly.
Under the current scheme, a victim of securities fraud, for exam-
ple, may be able to recover either compensatory damages under
the federal securities law or treble damages under RICO. With-
out a Congressional determination that the remedies provided
by existing securities laws are inadequate, this result is inexplic-
able and unjustifiable. Until Congress speaks, federalization of
commercial fraud will continue as an unintended collateral effect
of a criminal legislative scheme, and many judges and commen-
tators will continue to feel uneasy about this developing body of
law.
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